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MIDDLE EAST: THE STRATEGIC POWER-PLAY BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND RESURGENT RUSSIA

Introductory Observations

The Middle East region as a “strategic cockpit” for power-play between the United States and formerly the Soviet Union and now a resurgent Russia needs no introduction.

During the Cold War the power-blocs confrontation in Europe was replicated in the Middle East between the United States and Western supported oil-rich Arab monarchial kingdoms and the Soviet supported and armed Arab socialist military regimes of Egypt, Libya, Syria and Iraq. The overall military balance was in favor of the United States with sizeable and regionally powerful nations like Turkey and Iran also in the United States camp.

In the wake of the end of the Second World War the Middle East enjoyed the notorious distinction of being a region consistently plagued with armed conflicts. The Arab-Israeli Wars of 1948, 1969, 1973, the Anglo French invasion of the Suez Canal, the Iraq-Iran War, the two Gulf Wars in Iraq and Israeli Wars with Arab militias in Lebanon provide an unbroken string of conflicts from 1948 to 2008.

During the Cold War, Israel provided the stimulus for Arab Wars against the Jewish State and now the confrontation continues existentially till date.

In the post Cold War era with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the successor state of Russia ceased to be a contender for power rivalry in the Middle East.

Here what needs to be singularly noted is that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union participated directly in regional armed conflicts. Their strategic power-play was more in the nature of military assertive proxy initiatives by their regional clients and regime changes.

The United States for the first time got directly involved in fighting in the Middle East in Gulf War I (1991-92) and Gulf War II (2002-2003) in Iraq. The United States was prompted to do so by its concerns of nuclear program of Iraq and more lately to combat the “global war on terror” unleashed by Islamic Jihadi organizations.

While the United States was so strategically and militarily involved in Middle East armed conflicts. Russia’s resurgence was decisively taking place in a strategically uninhibited manner fuelled by voluminous arms sales to China primarily and more lately the windfall in oil revenues.

Russia’s strategic resurgence was noticed by the Middle East nations and even traditionally staunch major Arab allies of the United States like Saudi Arabia now seemed to be open to develop unprecedented military ties with Russia.

The overall strategic picture in the Middle East today is that one finds that the unchallenged strategic predominance of the United States since the end of the Cold War now being contended by a resurgent Russia.

The Russian challenge is not military in nature and content but is a more comprehensive strategic challenge. What one is witnessing currently in the Middle East is that Russia is forcefully engaged in re-embedding itself in the Middle East after gap of nearly 15.17 years.

Some of the perspectives that need to be examined in the developing strategic scenario in the Middle East power-play are discussed in this Paper as follows:

Russia’s Re-entry into the Middle East Strategic Calculus: The Dimensions
United States and Russia: Do any Strategic Convergences Exist in the Middle East?
United States and Russia Emerging Power-Play in the Middle East: The Perspectives
Russia’s Re-entry into the Middle East Strategic Calculus: The Dimensions

President (now Prime Minister) Putin has been the prime architect of Russia’s re-entry into the Middle East strategic calculus. President Putin’s strategic forays in the Middle East stand analyzed in a number of SAAG Paper of this Author, so entitled covering the period 2005-2008.

Providentially for Russia the period 2005-2008 turned out to be ripe for Russia’s re-entry into the Middle East successfully, for two major reasons:

In this period, the United States got inextricably mired in Afghanistan and Iraq and the United States image in the Arab and Islamic World had sunk low, even amongst its strong traditional allies.
Russia’s strategic resurgence had come into being facilitated by Russia’s economic resurgence and strength accruing from windfalls in oil revenues.
In such a contextual strategic environment, the Russian blueprint under President Putin seemed to be focused not on building a strong military presence in the Middle East directly or by proxy, but more importantly to acquire strong “strategic leverages” which would enhance Russia’s political image, political reputation and strategic profile in the Middle East.

In terms of enhancement of Russia’s political image and political reputation in the Middle East, besides Russia’s own efforts, substantial accretions accrued from the spin-off of the downslide of American image and prestige in the Arab and Islamic world after developments in Iraq.

Russia had nothing to lose by giving vocal political support and assertions on political issues close to the heart of the Arab world, which the United States could not strategically afford.

The Russian strategic blueprint for the Middle East had more subtle over tones. It was not to made visible as a strong military presence in the Middle East to countervail United States strategic predominance.

The Russian blueprint secured to be intent on a “chisel-effect” aimed at loosening the strong security linkages of the United States to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar and other Gulf kingdoms.

President Putin’s strategic forays in the Middle East commenced with visits to Egypt, Israel and Palestine and followed by visits to Jordan, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Nothing more needs to be said in terms of the “strategic symbolism” that Russia wanted to convey in terms of re-entry into the Middle East.

It can be asserted fairly today that with a highly successful visit to Saudi Arabia by President Putin last year and a $ 4 billion arms purchase order now to Russia by Saudi Arabia, Russian embedment in the Middle East is complete.

Russia today has a strategic footing today in the largest and politically most significant Arab nation in the world, besides its being the leader of the Islamic world too.

Other Arab nations can be expected to take a lead from Saudi Arabia in opening up strategically to Russia.

The most potent “strategic leverage” that Russia today enjoys in the Middle East is its strategic hold over Iran. This has a strategic significance not only for Arab nations which fear Iranian adventurism but it also has a significance for the United States and Israel who have no options to restrain Iran from its nuclear weapons program short of direct military intervention or military strikes.

All of the above factors added together impart strength and re-inforce Russia’s embedment in the Middle East and a role in the power politics of the region.

United States and Russia: Do Any Strategic Convergences Exist in the Middle East?

Strategic power-play does not necessarily imply military confrontation and armed conflict. Power-play implies the use of political, economic and strategic leverages to get the appropriate results for ones national security interests in a region.

Even at the height of the Cold War and the wars in the Middle East, the United States and Russia used back channel diplomacy and consultations for conflict-escalation prevention. One could say that there was some sort of “shared strategic management” of the Middle East.

Therefore, even today one can reasonably assert that despite the power-play in action between the United States and Russia in the Middle East, some significant strategic convergences exist between these two global players.

The strategic convergences that can be assessed to exist in the Middle East between the United States and Russia are as follows:

Iran’s nuclear program is a vital strategic convergence. While the United States would not even shirk from military action to pre-empt Iranian nuclear weapons development, Russia today is also on record that it is against Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.
Israel’s security and existence as a nation state seems also to be a strategic convergence between USA and Russia.
Islamic terrorism Jehad has visited both USA and Russia and its roots lay in Pakistan and the Middle East. Both USA and Russia should have a strategic convergence on combating it.
United States and Russia Emerging Power-Play in the Middle East: The Perspectives

The emerging power-play in the Middle East between the United States and Russia can be said to be no longer determined by ideological considerations.

The emerging power-play in the Middle East needs to be viewed in terms of geo-strategic and geo-political terms and in terms of “strategic leverages” that each nation can retain or acquire in this highly strategic region of the world.

In terms of geo-strategic considerations, the United States has an edge in the region with a strategic forward military presence in the region and the bases provided by nations of the Middle East. Israel with its strong and hard-hitting military machine coupled with nuclear weapons is a strong asset for USA. Additionally the United States potent global military presence and its ability to have drawn NATO into a military presence as far as Afghanistan is a strong strategic advantage.

Russia today or even in the next couple of decades cannot replicate the United States strategic power in the region.

In terms of geo-political influence in the Middle East, it can be stated that the prevailing environment places both USA and Russia as evenly matched in the region. Russia’s “Iran leverage” would enable Russia to be politically sought by the Arab nations, Israel and the United States.

The ensuing power-play in the Middle East in the most simplest terms can be stated as the United States endeavoring to restore its traditional “strategic leverages” in the Middle East devalued by its Iraq involvement and the relentless pursuit by Russia to garner the “strategic leverages” that the USA lost in the Middle East.

So in terms of prospects, one can safely state that where “strategic convergences” exist between USA and Russia as outlined above, both nations can be expected to act together in cooperation to ensure a stable Middle East.

Russia not dependent for its “energy security” on the Middle East has to recognize and concede that the Untied States and the West bank heavily in the Middle East for their “energy security”, and this aspect will have to be factored-in in Russian strategic perspectives. strategic exploitation of this aspect by Russia would attract sharp ripostes from USA.

The United States has to recognize that Russia as a resurgent power would have the urge to re-establish itself in the Middle East strategic calculus. All Russian initiatives in the Middle East that emerge in the future need not be viewed by USA through the erstwhile Cold War prism of military confrontation.

Mercifully today one does not witness Russia in any way exploiting the virulent anti-America Islamic Jehad directed at USA and that is a significant incentive for both USA and Russia to engage in “cooperative security management” of the turbulent Middle East region.

Concluding Observations

The United States despite its current strategic distractions in Iraq and Afghanistan can be expected to be the predominant global power in the Middle East. Further, the United States in terms of its national security interests of ensuring Israel’s security and safeguarding its energy security can be expected to be firmly resolute in facing any strategic challenges. America has both the power and the “will to use power” in the Middle East.

With such forceful strategic advantages in favor of the Untied States, a resurgent Russia will not attempt to give military overtones to its power-play in the Middle East. Russia’s power-play in the Middle East can therefore be expected to be more subtle in terms of acquiring “strategic leverages” in the region which would impart such a strategic importance to Russia that it cannot be discounted from the overall strategic calculus of the Middle East.

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